Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) - Meetings of States Parties
General debate statement on Amended Protocol II (Mines, booby-traps and other devices)
by Ms Valerie Grey, Counsellor and Deputy Permanent Representative, Disarmament, Australian Permanent Mission
11 November 2009
Mr President
At the outset, let me congratulate you on your election as President of this Annual Conference.
This Protocol marked a significant advance in addressing humanitarian concerns relating to anti-personnel landmines.
Its prohibition of booby-traps, restrictions on anti-personnel landmines and provisions on marking and fencing represented important humanitarian developments in international law.
Moreover, the adherence of key mine-using and producing states has helped to broaden the scope of these gains.
Australia welcomes Georgia as a new State Party since the last Annual Conference, bringing the total number of States Parties to Amended Protocol II to 93.
Australia looks forward to hearing from States Parties on their efforts to implement Amended Protocol II during today’s meeting.
Australia has continued to implement its obligations under Amended Protocol II and of course as a State Party to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. Australia’s implementation of Amended Protocol II is set out in our national report for 2008-09 available on the CCW website.
Australia’s contribution to mine action is also set out in our national report. As a major mine action donor, we have committed $75 million over the past 5 years to clearance, victim assistance and mine risk education, primarily in our own region of the Asia-Pacific.
Mr President
Australia supported efforts in 2008 and this year to revitalize and re-energise our work under Amended Protocol II.
We welcomed the opportunity to discuss how to tackle problems associated with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) during the group of experts meeting in April 2009. We would like to thank the Friend of the President, Reto Wollenmann of Switzerland, for the useful and constructive discussions during the experts’ meeting as well as his report to this Conference.
As Australia stated at the Group of Experts meeting in April, IEDs are a threat to military forces and the broader civilian population in those countries where these weapons are indiscriminately deployed. Through terrorist bombings in Bali and Jakarta and in our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, Australia, like many other countries represented here, has been affected by IEDs. We have lost many of our citizens and our soldiers to these devices and we are investing in the development of effective countermeasures to these weapons and their deployment.
IEDs are relatively easy to construct and many of their components are readily available. They are devised, funded, sourced, constructed, transported and deployed by a large network of individuals, much like a criminal organization. It is a complex system and difficult to defeat.
There is a great deal of work being conducted in military and police forces to defeat the IED problem and to protect military and civilian personnel from their effects. We think discussions in the CCW should focus on those areas where there is scope to limit access to explosives or their precursor materials.
Controls need to limit access by non-state actors to military munitions and explosive remnants of war. This could be achieved by States enhancing their stockpile security, tightening export controls and promoting universal acceptance of Protocol V to the CCW.
Unfortunately, controls also need to limit access to commercially available explosive precursors, which is extremely difficult. In this sense, the implementation of Protocol V will go some way to limiting access to military high explosive materials. Conversely, Amended Protocol II has only limited applicability to restrict the availability of commercial precursors.
In addressing the IED issue, we must consider overlaps with other international instruments, such as the 1991 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection. This provides a useful model for exploring how controls could be introduced to limit the potential for the manufacture of home-made explosives or on the control of commercially available explosives and detonation systems. Work in other relevant fields should also be explored, including in countering organised crime, and tracking the movement of illicit of funds.
Australia considers that continued dialogue and exchange of expertise on IEDs is valuable in the context of Amended Protocol II. We therefore support the Friend of the President’s recommendation that the Group of Experts continue to explore the issue of IEDs.
Australia looks forward to hearing the views of others on these challenging and important topics.
Thank you.